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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 08-1073

MIRZA TALIB BAIG,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent

On a Petition For Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Agency No. A79-732-469
Immigration Judge: Rosalind K. Malloy

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 15, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, STAPLETON AND COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 15, 2008)

OPINION

PER CURIAM
Petitioner Mirza Talib Baig, a native of Iraq and citizen of Pakistan, seeks review
of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals, dismissing his appeal of the
Immigration Judge’s order denying his motion to reopen. Finding no error, we will deny

the petition for review.
Baig was admitted into the United States at Anchorage, Alaska on or about April
27, 2002 as a nonimmigrant visitor (B-2) with authorization to remain until October 20,
2002. He overstayed and admittedly is removable, at a minimum, under Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), because he remained
in the United States for a time longer than permitted.1 Baig initially requested asylum,
withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture; however, he
subsequently withdrew those applications and was granted voluntary departure on August
18, 2006. An alternate order of removal was entered. On November 16, 2006, Baig filed
a motion to reopen with the Immigration Court, requesting that his case be reopened for
the purpose of applying for adjustment of status based on his marriage to a United States
citizen, who had filed a Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) on his behalf.
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) opposed the motion on or about
December 4, 2006 on the ground that a previous wife had also filed a relative petition on
Baig’s behalf. The prior relative petition had been denied, on July 29, 2004, based upon a
finding by Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) that the marriage was
entered into fraudulently and solely to obtain immigration benefits. Based on Baig’s
marital history, DHS contended that it was highly unlikely that his new Form I-130 would
be approved, see 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) (“[N]o petition shall be approved if (1) the alien has

1

Baig was placed in removal proceedings by a Notice to Appear which was served on
him on September 8, 2003.
2

previously ... sought to be accorded an immediate relative or preference status as the
spouse of a citizen of the United States ... by reason of a marriage determined by the
Attorney General to have been entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration
laws”). The USCIS decision and written explanation was submitted as evidence by DHS.
A.R. 201-02.
On December 8, 2006, the Immigration Judge denied Baig’s motion to reopen
without explanation. Baig timely appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, and
DHS opposed the appeal. On December 14, 2007, the Board dismissed the appeal,
concluding that DHS’ opposition to the motion mandated denial, and, further, Baig had
failed to present a prima facie case establishing a bona fide marriage as required by 8
C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(iii)(B) and In re: Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. & N. Dec. 253 (BIA 2002).
This timely petition for review followed.
We will deny the petition for review. We have jurisdiction to review the Board’s
decision under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Where, as here, the Board issues a decision on the
merits, we review the Board’s, and not the IJ’s, decision. Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530,
534 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005); Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 548-49 (3d Cir. 2001). When
a motion to reopen is denied on the ground that the alien failed to demonstrate prima facie
eligibility for the substantive relief sought, we review for abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992). Under this
standard, we will reverse the Board’s decision only if it is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary
to law. See Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004). The prima facie standard
3

for a motion to reopen requires the applicant to produce objective evidence showing a
reasonable likelihood that he can establish that he is entitled to relief. See Sevoian v.
Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2002).
The Board did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Baig failed to present in
his motion a prima facie case establishing that his second marriage to a United States
citizen was bona fide. Under Board precedent, a properly filed motion to reopen for
adjustment of status based on a marriage entered into after the commencement of removal
proceedings may be granted, notwithstanding the pendency of visa petition, if:
(1) the motion is timely filed; (2) the motion is not numerically barred by
the regulations; (3) the motion is not barred by Matter of Shaar . . . or on
any other procedural grounds; (4) the motion presents clear and convincing
evidence indicating a strong likelihood that the respondent’s marriage is
bona fide; and (5) [DHS] either does not oppose the motion or bases its
opposition solely on Matter of Arthur.
Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 256.
Baig had an opportunity to present evidence that his second marriage was bona
fide, and he failed to do so. The materials he submitted, including a copy of his marriage
certificate, copies of his and his wife’s passports, copies of their birth certificates, a copy
of his divorce decree, and a letter confirming his employment establish only the existence
of a marriage. This evidence is not probative of the motivation for the marriage, and it is
thus not probative of the bona fides of the marriage. See Malhi v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 336 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2003).2 Baig submitted no evidence
2

Materials which may demonstrate that a marriage is bona fide include: (1)
documentation showing joint ownership of property; (2) a lease showing joint tenancy of
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whatever that his second marriage to a United States citizen was bona fide, let alone
“clear and convincing evidence,” as required by Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 256.
Furthermore, we reject his assertion on appeal that the Board impermissibly engaged in
fact finding.3 The Board properly considered the materials in the record in assessing
whether the evidence submitted by Baig with his motion to reopen complied with the
standards set forth in Velarde-Pacheco for motions seeking adjustment of status based on
a recent marriage to a United States citizen.
The Board also did not abuse its discretion in denying Baig’s motion to reopen on
the ground that it was opposed by DHS on substantive grounds (that is, on the ground that
his first marriage was found to have been entered into for the purpose of evading the
immigration laws of the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c)). Under Velarde-Pacheco, a
motion to reopen based on a marriage entered into after the commencement of removal
proceedings cannot be granted if it is opposed by DHS. See Bhiski v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d
363, 371-72 (3d Cir. 2004) (“As long as [DHS] opposes the motion on non- Matter of
Arthur grounds, the alien does not fall within the exception carved out by Matter of

a common residence; (3) evidence of commingling of financial resources; (4) birth
certificates of children born to the petitioner and beneficiary; (5) affidavits of third parties
having knowledge of the bona fides of the marital relationship; and (6) any other
documentation which is relevant to establish that the marriage was not entered into in
order to evade the immigration laws of the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(i)(B).
3

Except for taking administrative notice of commonly known facts, the Board may not
engage in fact finding in the course of deciding appeals. 8 C.F.R. §1003.1(d)(3)(iv).
Findings of fact made by an Immigration Judges are reviewed only for clear error. Id. at
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i).
5

Velarde-Pacheco”). Here, DHS objected to the motion on non-Arthur grounds. We will
not consider Baig’s contention that DHS’ opposition to his motion was untimely by as
much as a week (and thus his motion should be deemed unopposed), because he did not
raise this contention concerning a failure to comply with the Immigration Court’s local
rules either with the IJ or the Board. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (alien must exhaust
administrative remedies available as of right).
Baig’s final argument is similarly unavailing. He contends that he should have
been provided with an opportunity to challenge in Immigration Court the July 2004
USCIS finding that his first marriage was fraudulently entered into, but the IJ had no
authority to entertain a collateral challenge to the District Director’s determination. 8
U.S.C. § 1154; 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(e)(1); see also Matter of Aurelio, 19 I. & N. Dec. 458,
460 (BIA 1987) (immigration judges have no jurisdiction to decide visa petition as this
matter is solely within authority of district director); cf. Bhiski, 373 F.3d at 371 (courts do
not have jurisdiction to investigate good faith validity of DHS’ opposition to motion to
reopen brought under Velarde-Pacheco). Baig’s first United States citizen wife did not
appeal the denial of the Form I-130 visa petition she filed on his behalf, and the IJ could
not reconsider the merits of that petition at Baig’s request.
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.

6

